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Section 1. Introduction
This paper explores the diffusion of an important agricultural innovation in late 19 century th Ireland: the centrifugal milk separator, which made it possible to extract a greater proportion of the butter fat in milk, and to do so more quickly and hygienically. Throughout, the paper uses Denmark as a benchmark by which to judge Irish performance, as was the universal practice among Irish agricultural reformers at that time. Separators spread much more quickly in Denmark than in Ireland, despite the fact that both countries were important dairy producers, located in north-west Europe, and selling to the same market (Britain). This paper argues that the slower diffusion in Ireland was not just due to different comparative advantages (for example, related to numbers of dairy cattle, and thus indirectly to variables such as land quality, population and climate), but to a variety of institutional and political factors as well. It argues that the structure of property rights mattered for the productivity of Irish farmers, and thus for the demand for cream separators. Furthermore, O'Rourke (2007) shows that a history of violence and political conflict between different social and religious groups hampered the diffusion of another, institutional innovation, namely the cooperative organisational form, in Ireland. This paper goes on to argue that this may have mattered for the diffusion of cream separators, at least in those regions where cooperation would have been particularly useful.
The paper is thus related to several literatures. First, the findings regarding the structure of property rights in Ireland speak to the theoretical literature on firm ownership (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986), as well as to the literature on land reform (e.g. Banerjee 2000) . Second, the literature on the impact of ethnic divisions and ethnic conflict on economic policies and performance (e.g.
Easterly and Levine 1997) finds an echo in this paper's argument that political divisions between
Catholics and Protestants hampered the diffusion of cooperative organisations in Ireland, and thus the diffusion of cream separators in some regions. However, while that literature largely focusses on the impact of ethnic divisions on public policy decisions, this paper is concerned with the private sector diffusion of technological and organisational innovations. Third, the paper engages with the empirical findings of authors such as Robert Barro (1991) , based on cross-country growth regressions, that education is good for growth: a common interpretation is that poor countries may grow more rapidly than rich ones by importing best-practice technology, but only if their educational levels are sufficiently high (Easterlin 1981 , Abramovitz 1986 ). Of necessity, such cross-country regression exercises tend to be fairly crude. It would be nice to know whether these aggregate correlations are really being driven by the mechanisms identified by theory as being important. Does literacy (or indeed political stability, or well-defined property rights) really promote investment and innovation as the theory suggests? In order to answer such a question, it is necessary to look in greater detail at particular innovations, and identify the factors which facilitated or hindered their diffusion. Dairying in late 19 century Denmark and Ireland offers a promising test case (on Denmark, see Kindleberger th 1951). The contribution of this paper is that it provides detailed empirical evidence at a fairly disaggregated level on the economic effects of property rights, institutional and political forces, education, and other variables, and on the mechanisms which were involved in linking these variables to economic outcomes. The econometric exercises involve Irish rather than Danish data, and the focus is thus on explaining relatively slow diffusion in Ireland rather than rapid diffusion in Denmark. However, a comparative perspective yields benchmarks by which Irish performance can be judged, as well as a range of hypotheses and qualitative evidence that can help make sense of the Irish data.
Section 2 establishes that the Irish dairying performance was less satisfactory than the Danish between 1880 and 1913, particularly as regards the diffusion of modern cream separators. Section 3 lists some of the hypotheses that have been advanced to explain this relatively unimpressive Irish performance. Three broad classes of arguments are considered: those relating to the local supply of milk; those relating to the costs of investment in the new technology; and arguments blaming poor education. Section 4 tests these various hypotheses econometrically, using cross-country Irish data for 1906. Section 5 broadens the scope of the article. It first reviews briefly the arguments advanced in a companion paper, O'Rourke (2007) , concerning the determinants of cooperation in Irish This section draws on O' Rourke (2006 Rourke ( , 2007 .
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See for example , Crotty (1966) or Lee (1989) . It might, on the other hand, be 2 argued that New Zealand is in some ways a better comparison for Ireland: for example, the seasonality of butter production was very similar in Ireland and New Zealand (more precisely, given their different geographical locations, New Zealand seasonality was almost the exact inverse of the Irish one), while butter production was more spread out across the year in Denmark (Henriksen and O'Rourke 2005) . Seasonality is not, however, a focus of this paper. Solow (1971), p. 151. 3 Cited by , p. 298. In this ideal Plunkett was fully supported by none other than 4 Andrew Carnegie: see Ehrlich (1981) In the econometrics, I control for two other variables that may have had an influence on the supply of milk. The first is farm size, and in particular the share of very small farms. These are likely to have been less efficient than other farms. In addition, a greater proportion of the milk produced on such farms would have been consumed on the farm (given that a farming family would have consumed roughly the same amount of milk, regardless of whether they worked a small or a large farm), leaving less for the creameries. The regressions will thus include the share of farms less than 5 acres in size. Second, there were topographical and land quality differences between the four Irish provinces that traditionally implied different agricultural specialisations and productivities. Povertystricken Connaught in the west had generally poor land, and was the least prosperous province. While there were also several poor areas along the western seaboard of Munster, this southern province contained many of Ireland's most prosperous dairying areas, in particular the so-called Golden Vale, whose fertile land implied high milk yields. The land in Leinster was relatively good, but cattle farmers there tended (relatively speaking) to specialize in beef rather than dairying. Ulster was the most prosperous province, but this was primarily based on its industry rather on its agriculture; indeed, the land in Ulster was not particularly fertile, and the climate there was slightly harsher than it was further south. The expectation is thus that a Munster dummy variable would have a significant and positive effect on the diffusion of cream separators (although, to repeat, this is a very crude variable, which does not take account of the undoubted differences in land quality between west Cork or Clare on the one hand, and the relatively fertile lands of Limerick and Tipperary on the other).
Were these endowment variables the only ones that mattered for separator diffusion, or did other factors matter as well, for example the institutional environment of the day? Another factor determining the supply of milk in an area was the productivity of the individual farmer, which was reflected in the milk yields which he obtained from his cattle, and in the butter fat content of the milk.
An important tradition in the Irish historiography has debated whether farmer productivity might have been related to the Irish system of land tenure. Irish agricultural land had traditionally been owned by landlords, who let it out to tenant farmers. However, the landlords played no role in running their tenants' farms. Not only did tenant farmers and their families do all the work on their farms (by the late 19 century, labour on the farms was carried out by the farmers themselves, since th landless agricultural labourers effectively vanished as a class in the decades following the Famine:
see Fitzpatrick 1980) ; key decisions about how to run their farms, as well as key investment decisions, were taken by the farmers on the ground rather than by the landlords. Indeed, the landlords often lived in Britain rather than Ireland, invested little (Ó Gráda 1975) , and were for the most part content merely to collect their rent from farmers who farmed the same holding all their lives, and passed it on to their children. The traditional view among Irish commentators held that this landlordtenant system discouraged investment in agriculture. Not only did absentee landlords not invest, but tenants feared that if they themselves invested, any benefit they derived would be appropriated by landlords raising their rent. If this argument is correct, then owner occupancy of farms should have been positively related to economic performance. In terms of Grossman and Hart (1986) , owner occupancy represented an allocation of ownership rights that minimized ex ante investment distortions (or at least lowered them substantially relative to the traditional landlord-tenant system).
On the other hand, a more recent revisionist literature has argued that (a) the traditional Irish land tenure system did not harm Irish agriculture, and (b) that land reform did not benefit it. The first position was most famously articulated in Barbara Solow's (1971) Second, Solow emphasized that one effect of the turmoil over property rights in land was that enormous effort and resources went, literally, into rent-seeking activities. (By contrast, tenant reform in Denmark had already largely taken place by mid century: see Jensen 1937, pp. 125-6 .) The effect of the 1870 Act was, she writes, "a signal to both sides to "look to their rights" and gird for further battle. But the real problem in Ireland was not the division of a given pie, but the provision of a larger one..." She is even harsher about the effects of the 1881 Land Act, which enabled tenant 10 farmers to go to court to obtain judicially determined rent reductions:
Incentives to adjust the economy in the face of new international conditions were to some extent paralysed. There is no need to take too seriously landlord contentions that everybody rushed to court and neglected his farming, but if tenants could increase income more by litigation than by changing agricultural techniques, they would certainly do so. If valuers were swayed by appearances, a premium was even put on worse farming, and consequent dilapidation...with the tenants of Ireland crowding into court, no one was thinking about agricultural education, credit and marketing programs, improved cropping, selective breeding, and, in general, ways of assisting tenants to adjust to changed economic conditions.
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More recently, Guinnane and Miller (1997, p. 591) have argued that "The Irish [land] reforms contained little that could better the allocation of resources and so had little impact on economic efficiency, even though the end result was the creation of a class of peasant proprietors See for example the case of Lord Granard, in Dooley (2001). 12 In the discussion that follows, the term 'farmer' is used throughout to refer to tenant farmers, or 13 owner occupiers. It does not refer to landlords. 9 operating in a free market...Land reform in Ireland was much more a wealth-redistribution program financed by Britain than a serious effort to improve the efficiency of agriculture."
As it happens, these traditional and revisionist hypotheses can be tested with the available data, at least insofar as they relate to dairying. Prior to the Wyndham Act, British government land reform policies had not led to any great transfer of ownership toward tenant farmers. However, that piece of legislation massively subsidised such transfers (see Guinnane and Miller 1997 for details).
Landlords were encouraged to sell their estates to the government via cash bonuses and other incentives; tenants were encouraged to buy their farms from the government by a provision which stated that their annual payments would be 10 to 30 percent lower than their existing rents. This meant that all tenants faced an irresistible incentive to buy. Predictably, tenants everywhere immediately tried to buy out their holdings. The resulting transfers of ownership were limited only by the willingness of landlords to sell, and that depended on their own financial and personal circumstances rather than on any pressure from tenants. The Wyndham Act thus gave rise to a 12 massive transfer of ownership of family farms away from absentee landlords and towards farming families; moreover, this transfer of ownership was essentially exogenous to the farmers themselves.
By 1906, the year for which there are data, the share of tenant farmers owning their own property ranged from 15.4 percent in County Louth to 52.5 percent in County Londonderry. The prediction of the traditional argument regarding Irish landlord-tenant relations is thus that in counties with higher levels of owner occupancy, farm productivity was higher, and milk supplies (and therefore the demand for cream separators) was higher, ceteris paribus, than in counties where the transfer of ownership from landlord to tenant was less advanced. Another variable which some commentators have argued may have mattered for diffusion is literacy, or education more generally. An important strand in the international literature has emphasised the importance of education for technological diffusion in general (Easterlin 1981 , Abramovitz 1986 , Barro 1991 , and for technological diffusion in agriculture specifically. Thus, Schultz (1983, p.189) argues that education was crucial for Danish innovation, while Griliches (1963) documents the links between education and agricultural productivity in the 20 century U.S.
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Corresponding to such arguments is one which was widespread in Ireland at the time, namely that Irish peasant farmers were too conservative, suspicious, poorly-educated or ignorant to adopt cooperation and the milk separator. Smith-Gordon and Staples, the former an employee of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (IAOS, the umbrella group for Irish agricultural cooperative societies), wrote in 1917 that "the most serious obstacle to the co-operative movement was and remains the conservatism of the Irish farmer. Many projects which would have brought great benefit to the country have been abandoned because the lords of the soil were suspicious, or did not understand" (Smith-Gordon and Staples 1917, 47-48) , an opinion with which Liam Kennedy (1976, 177) concurs. Even when they did establish creameries, it was claimed that they were often reluctant to invest adequately in them:
It seems absurd to some farmers to sanction the payment of a salary to a skilled Manager (of the creamery) in excess of their own incomes. This is one of the chief short-comings in productive cooperation, and it is this that gives the proprietor his chance. His business instinct shows him plainly that a good man is worth a good wage, and hence it is that some of the very best men the movement has produced have been tempted to leave it for situations outside, where their brains and skill will be adequately rewarded. The Co-operative Creamery Manager is too often driven by circumstances to become a "rolling stone"...He seldom is provided with an adequate residence and his wages are frequently cut down during the winter months, though he has been obliged to compress more than a year's work, done at high pressure, into the summer months (IAOS 1904, 16 ).
Poor farming might not just have been responsible for the failure to adopt modern creameries. Milk yields in Ireland on the eve of the Great War were at most 400 gallons per cow, up from maybe 350 gallons in the mid-1850s (Solar 1989-90, 153) : an increase of 14% over some sixty years. It was reckoned by contemporaries that they were maybe 100 gallons less in Connaught (IAOS 1914, 11) . By contrast, Danish milk yields rose by 22% in the 15 years before 1914, by which time they stood at some 700 gallons per cow (Statistiske Meddelelser 1915, 42; Smith-Gordon and Staples 1917, 111 ). Ireland's dismal performance in this regard was partly attributed to bulls in Ulster being selected for their meat potential, arguably an example of comparative advantage at work; elsewhere, however, it was claimed that the best heifers were sold, and the 'culls' retained to renew the farmer's dairy herd (IAOS 1914, 11) . Similarly, the Irish farmer's refusal to engage in winter dairying was often decried as an example of self-defeating conservatism, although the counterargument was just as often heard that it would not be worth the farmer's while.
Decrying such behaviour as constituting 'entrepreneurial failure' was common at the time (although not in those words), but such claims cannot be tested with the data at my disposal and are not a focus of the present paper. Rather, I am interested in testing a more measurable hypothesis: that poor education (which might of course have reflected rational decision-making on the part of Irish peasants) retarded the spread of new agricultural technologies in pre-1914 Ireland. How did education in Denmark and Ireland compare at this time? Denmark was clearly a more educated society than Ireland in the nineteenth century. Compulsory education, for 3 days a week between the ages of 7 and 14, was introduced in Denmark in 1814; in 1849 compulsory education was extended to cover a 6-day week. Although there are comparatively few data to support the claim, it seems clear Cipolla (1969) well as in 1911). I also ran the regressions using 1906 values for these variables, which were generated by interpolation between 1901 and 1911. Not surprisingly, the results were unaffected. I have presented here the results using 1901 data since these are 'real' data, in contrast to the interpolated data which are merely informed speculation. A data appendix gives the sources for all variables. Here and elsewhere results are calculated using CLARIFY (Tomz et al. 2001) , as described in King 20 et al. (2000) , and use the specification in equation (3).
In principle one might worry about tenants and owner occupiers differing in some unobservable 21 way that accounted for the difference in productivity between the two groups, but this was not a factor in this instance. As explained above, the provisions of the Wyndham Act implied that tenants everywhere wished to become owner occupiers; whether they had in fact become so by 1906 depended solely on their landlords, and there was nothing that tenants could do, or did do, to speed up the process. However, cow density is not the beginning and end of the story. Column (2) introduces the share of owner-occupied farms into the specification, and the result is a striking confirmation of the argument that owner-occupancy was better for productivity than traditional landlord-tenant arrangements. The coefficient on owner-occupancy is positive and strongly statistically significant; moreover, it is also economically significant. Increasing the share of owner-occupied farms by one standard deviation (9.2) relative to its mean value (29.6) would lead to the expected number of creameries per county increasing by 5.46, relative to an expected value of 6.56 when all right hand side variables are set equal to their mean values.
These are big effects. Moreover, this is a robust finding, as a glance across the successive columns in Table 2 will confirm. The results vindicate not only traditional nationalist critiques of the Irish landlord-tenant system, but the predictions of Grossman and Hart (1986) and the associated literature on vertical integration. Property rights mattered for the productivity of Irish agriculture, 21 and owner occupancy was beneficial: this is the first major finding of this paper.
Equation (3) introduces the other variables that the previous discussion suggested should
The omitted province in these regressions is Connaught. Finally, one possible objection to Ó Gráda's argument that cow density was the crucial factor Indeed, my main purpose is to show that endowments alone cannot explain the diffusion of 23 creameries and cooperatives; therefore anything that weakens his argument strengthens mine.
Henriksen (1999) tries to instrument for cow density in the Danish context and finds that doing this 24 makes no difference to her results.
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explaining separator diffusion in Ireland is the possibility that cow density might be endogenous (and in particular, that an increase in creamery activity in an area might lead to a corresponding rise in the local herd). Although Ó Gráda's argument is not the focus of this paper, columns (5) and (6) 23 replicate the specifications of columns (3) and (4), but replace cow numbers and cow density in 1906
with cow numbers and cow density in 1871. Milch cow numbers in 1871 were clearly exogenous to the number of cream separators in 1906, and indeed in any other year, since cream separators had not yet been invented in 1871 (they were invented in 1878). As can be seen, the results are qualitatively identical to those obtained earlier (with the coefficients on cow numbers becoming larger, and those on cow density becoming smaller-the only difference is that the banking coefficient now becomes statistically insignificant). This is hardly surprising, given that regions which had specialised in dairying in the past continued to do so after the advent of the separator. Of greater interest to this 24 paper is the fact that the coefficients on owner occupancy are larger under these alternative specifications, while the coefficients on illiteracy remain statistically insignificant.
Section 5. Political conflict, cooperation and separator diffusion
Thus far, the discussion has focussed solely on the diffusion of a new technology, cream separators. However, Ireland was also slower than Denmark at adopting an important organisational innovation, namely agricultural cooperatives. As Henriksen (1999) and others have argued, cooperatives were particularly useful in dairying . Economies of scale and small farm sizes meant that creameries in both Ireland and Denmark required the milk from many farms -perhaps around 50 -to be viable. A crucial problem facing creameries was how to ensure that all suppliers provided them with high-quality milk, since the quality of the creamery's output as a whole would suffer if individuals supplied milk that was not clean and fresh-tasting. Cooperative creameries in Denmark
For an extended discussion of the cooperative organizational form, and its advantages relative to 25 private creameries, see O'Rourke (2007) . See also Henriksen and Hviid (2004) .
17
locked their members into exclusivity arrangements, and were able to impose a variety of penalties on farmers who supplied low-quality milk. They were thus at an advantage relative to private creameries who would find it difficult to turn away low-quality farmers, for fear of not operating at minimum efficient scale. Presumably this advantage would have been greatest in regions with predominantly small farms, since big farms were likely to be more efficient and produce high-quality milk, even without the beneficial incentives provided by cooperation. However, as (Bolger 1977, p. 187; Kennedy 1978, pp. 63, 66) . While many priests became involved in cooperation at the parish level, Liam Kennedy (1978) has shown that relationships between themselves and the Irish cooperative movement became more strained as time wore on, despite the fact that the Church was actively promoting cooperation elsewhere in Europe . Kindleberger (1951) and Henriksen (1999) suggest, have been crucially important in facilitating the rapid spread of cooperative creameries there.
Social and political conflict thus impeded the diffusion of the cooperative organisational form in Ireland. Moreover, this lack of social cohesion might have impeded the diffusion of cream separators in areas where the cooperative organisational form was potentially most useful, that is to say in areas with small farms. Column (7) in Table 2 reduces the expected number of creameries by 0.9, relative to an expected value of 2.8 when all right hand side variables are set equal to their mean values: that is to say, by roughly a third. The results suggest that in areas with particularly high shares of small farms, a history of inter-communal tension did not just retard the spread of cooperatives, but was an obstacle to the spread of the new cream separator technology as well.
Section 6. Conclusion
There were very different forces at work explaining the introduction of the new cream separator technology into Ireland, on the one hand, and the cooperative organisational form on the other. Cream separators diffused where there were lots of cows per acre, just as Ó suggested. However, this paper has also shown that the structure of property rights in Ireland held back progress there. Diffusion was slower where farmers still rented their land from absentee landlords, consistent both with nationalist claims and with the theoretical literature on vertical 
